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ABSTRACT 
The majority of medium-to-large international organizations have adopted enterprise 
resource planning systems (ERPs) of which SAP R/3 is the current market leader. 
This paper proposes a framework for the separation of duties in SAP R/3. Separation 
of duties is viewed as a critical component of an organization’s internal control 
structure aimed primarily at reducing opportunities for fraudulent activities. 
R/3 assigns profiles consisting of authorizations to users. Accordingly, R/3 facilitates 
the implementation of ‘role-based access control’, where these profiles may be 
designed consistent with organizational roles and assigned to users performing these 
roles. This paper proposes a framework for adequate separation of duties using a role-
based approach in the Financial Accounting (FI) module of the R/3 system. Case 
studies were undertaken to refine the framework and to explore its application in a 
practical environment. This empirical research provided support for the adequacy of 
the proposed framework. 
 
Key Words: Role-Based Access Control, SAP R/3, Separation of Duties, Fraud, 
Authorization, Security. 
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1 BACKGROUND 
This paper develops a framework for the assessment of the separation of duties in an 
organization implementing the SAP R/3 enterprise resource planning system (ERP). 
R/3 assigns profiles consisting of authorizations to users. Accordingly, R/3 facilitates 
the implementation of ‘role-based access control’, where these profiles may be 
designed consistent with organizational roles and assigned to users performing these 
roles. This paper focuses on the separation of duties within the Financial Accounting 
(FI) Module of SAP R/3. Separation of duties is viewed as a critical component of an 
organization’s internal control structure aimed primarily at reducing opportunities for 
fraudulent activities.  
1.1 Threats to Security 
Computerised information systems, whilst providing many benefits to organizations, 
are also vulnerable to many threats including traditional threats to paper-based 
accounting systems and threats due to the nature of computerised information 
systems. These threats can be internal or external intruders’ attempting to access 
sensitive information, modify data, make fraudulent changes to programs, enter 
fraudulent transactions and perform other undesirable acts within the system. 
In order to threaten security in these ways, unauthorized users must penetrate the 
system or authorized users must gain access to unauthorized functions or areas within 
the system. Various methods have been used to perform such unauthorized functions 
[Peterson & Turn (1967: 291-2); Reid (1987: 103-5); Stoll (1988: 488-9); Smaha 
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(1988: 40); Spafford (1989); Seeley (1989: 700-3); and Lunt (1993). These methods 
include:  
Passive techniques, including wiretapping, electromagnetic pickup, concealed 
transmitters, and electronic eavesdropping. These methods are used to discover 
information such as usernames, passwords, and message content.  
Attempted break-ins, or password guessing, which are used to gain access through 
an authorized user’s login.  
Masquerading, which occurs when an intruder ‘masquerades’ as an authorized user. 
This can be achieved by several methods: logging in with the target user’s password 
and username; tapping into the line between the authorized user’s workstation and the 
central computer; or using an authorized user’s workstation that has been left logged 
on to the network.  
Browsing, which occurs when authorized users attempt to access unauthorized 
functions or sensitive data.  
Viruses and worms, which are programs that invade systems and are used to gain 
access to data, destroy or manipulate data and applications, or simply to use resources 
such as storage, memory, and processor time. 
This paper focuses on browsing techniques. Authorized users can be a threat if their 
activities are not restricted so as to prevent possible fraud or access to unauthorized 
areas in the system. Albrecht, Howe & Romney (1984) conducted a study of firms 
that were victims of fraud. They concluded that three elements contribute to the 
probability of an employee defrauding an organization. These elements are situational 
pressures of the employee, opportunities to commit fraud, and either a low level of 
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integrity or some way to rationalise the fraud. Of these three elements, the 
organization has control only over the level of opportunity to commit fraud within 
the organization.  
Albrecht, Howe & Romney (1984) examined organizational factors common to 
organizations that were victims of fraud. The most common factor identified was that 
too much trust was granted to certain employees. Other factors included the lack of: a 
proper procedure for authorisations, separation of transaction authorisation from 
custody of assets, and separation of accounting duties.  
A common theme among these organizational factors is that there is typically a lack 
of proper separation of duties in organizations that suffer fraud. These results indicate 
that organizations are under significant threat even from authorized users if those 
users’ activities are not correctly restricted. The next section introduces the main 
countermeasures available to organizations to counter these threats to security. 
1.2 Countermeasures 
In order to protect themselves from the threats to security outlined in the previous 
section, organizations may employ certain countermeasures. Best, Mohay & 
Anderson (1997) identifies four main categories:  
Authentication. This countermeasure is aimed at restricting entry into the system. 
The methods available to ensure proper authentication of users include user names 
with passwords, challenge-response systems, biometrics, and smart cards [Carroll 
(1987: 249-255) & Pfleeger (1989: 233, 453-454)].   
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Access control. This countermeasure is designed to prevent unauthorized user 
activities through browsing. The purpose of access control is to restrict users’ access 
to data and functions within the system in order to prevent unauthorized use [Ferrailo, 
Gilbert & Lynch (1992)]. Ideally users should be restricted to data and functions that 
are required for them to fulfil their organizational role. This is generally referred to as 
“role-based access control”. 
Cryptography. This countermeasure involves encoding data so that it will not be 
understandable if it is revealed through unauthorized access. This technique can be 
applied to data files, passwords, on line transactions, and other sensitive data [Davies 
& Price (1989)].   
Audit trail analysis. This is a post-hoc analysis of the records of user activity in the 
detailed system logs to detect failed attempts to perform unauthorized functions and to 
highlight unusual patterns of user behaviour, such as logins after hours. 
1.3 Separation of Duties 
Ferrailo, Gilbert & Lynch (1992) noted that “although more of a policy than a 
mechanism, separation of related duties is used in deterring fraud within financial 
systems. Such duties can include authorising, approving and recording transactions, 
issuing or receiving assets, and making payments. Separation of related duties refers 
to the situation where different users are given distinct, but often interrelated tasks 
such that a failure of one user to perform as expected will be detected by another. For 
separation of related duties to be effective, computer capabilities must be partitioned. 
These capabilities must be accessible only to users or processes associated with 
specific tasks”. 
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Research into internal controls and external auditors’ judgments has indicated that the 
assessment of separation of duties is a dominating factor in an auditor’s evaluation of 
an internal control structure [Ashton (1974); Ashton and Brown (1980); Hamilton and 
Wright (1982)]. Clark & Wilson (1987) examined commercial and military security 
models and found that separation of duties in performing transactions in commercial 
security models was an important aspect of maintaining data integrity. A simple 
model whereby a transaction could not be executed by one user, but must be broken 
up into two or more steps was proposed. The authors noted that this model was overly 
simplistic but stated that “the separation of duty determination can be rather complex, 
because the decisions for all the transactions interact”. 
Srinidhi (1994) performed a study of the importance of separation of duties as an 
internal control by means of a survey of auditors. The findings indicated that auditors 
place significantly lower reliance on internal control systems without adequate 
separation of duties. The functions identified as being incompatible were: 
1) Assigning the responsibilities for both authorising and executing a 
transaction to the same person. 
2) The same person is responsible for defining the conditions for a 
transaction and checking whether those conditions are satisfied. 
3) Combining the responsibilities for the authorisation of a transaction 
and the custody of the asset(s) involved in the transaction. 
4) Combining the responsibilities for authorising and accounting for a 
transaction. 
  Page 8 
5) Combining the responsibilities for the accounting of a transaction and 
the custody of the asset(s) involved in the transaction. 
6) Accounting functions for two different transactions are assigned to the 
same person. 
 
Arens et al (2000: 295-6) prescribes four general guidelines for the separation of 
duties that are designed to prevent both fraud and error: 
(a) Separation of the custody of assets from accounting. This prevents a person 
with custody of an asset from disposing of the asset and adjusting the records 
to conceal the action. 
(b) Separation of the authorization of transactions from the custody of related 
assets. The authorization of a transaction and the handling of the related asset 
by the same person increases the opportunity for fraud. 
(c) Separation of operational responsibility from record-keeping responsibility. If 
a division is responsible for preparing its own records and reports, there may 
be a tendency to bias the results to improve its reported performance. 
(d)  Separation of information technology (IT) duties from duties of key users 
outside IT. Program modifications should be performed only by authorized IT 
personnel. Users outside IT should be responsible for authorizing transactions, 
on-line data entry, correction of errors in input, and review of output from the 
system.  
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The extent to which duties may be separated depends on the size of the organization. 
Often, the apparent lack of adequate separation of duties in smaller organizations can 
be compensated for through the active involvement of the owner/manager. 
In ERP environments with hundreds or even thousands of users accessing the system 
on-line, the only way to separate duties within the computer system is to assign 
authorizations and profiles to users which prevent them from performing incompatible 
functions. A set of principles extending beyond those above are required to govern the 
development and assignment of these access rights.  
1.4 Separation of Duties Principles 
 
There is a significant amount of literature related to role-based access control and 
separation of duties [Kuhn (1997); Moffett (1988); Sandhu & Coyne (1996); Bertino, 
Ferrari & Atluri. (1997); Sandhu (1998), Kuhn (1997), Ahn & Sandhu (1999)]. This 
literature, however, does not progress any further toward a framework for separation 
of duties than that of Clark & Wilson (1987). 
This paper proposes seven basic principles for the separation of duties within the 
general ledger (GL), accounts receivable (AR), and accounts payable (AP) 
applications. 
1. Users who can create and modify master records should not be able to post 
transactions. Users who can maintain vendor master records and post transactions 
(invoices and payments) could create a fake vendor record and pay a fictitious 
invoice without detection. If these duties were separated, this fraud could only be 
accomplished with the collusion of two personnel.  
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2. Credit management should be separated from master record maintenance in 
accounts receivable. This is to avoid the master record clerk creating a fake 
customer master record and granting credit to it. 
3. Dunning and credit management should be separated from invoice and 
receipt data entry. This is to provide an independent check on data entry and to 
preserve the independence of the officer in charge of credit. 
4. Receipt data entry should be separated from invoice and credit memo data 
entry. This is to provide a check against lapping and other fraud and error. 
5. In accounts payable, cheques should be managed and payments performed 
by someone other than the person who enters vendor invoices. This ensures 
that payments and invoices are an independent check on each other. For example, 
if an employee could enter both then he or she could post a fictitious invoice and 
then pay it. 
6. Writing an off account receivable as a bad debt should be separated from 
receipt data entry. This is because a clerk could fail to record a receipt and write 
the account off as a bad debt to cover theft of cash. 
7. Users’ activities should not cross boundaries between GL, AR, and AP. This 
separation is necessary so that the control accounts in GL can provide a check 
against AR and AP and so that offsetting transactions between AR and AP are 
properly authorized. 
These principles are summarised in Table 1. 
Table 1 – Principles for the Separation of Duties  
The next section gives a brief overview of SAP R/3 and its security system. 
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1.5 SAP R/3 
SAP R/3 is an ERP. It is comprised of a collection of modules including financial 
accounting, cost controlling, materials management, production planning and human 
resources. Of these modules, only the Financial Accounting (FI) module is required 
for R/3 to function. The other modules provide further capabilities for the system and 
are integrated with FI. This research is concerned only with the FI Module and will 
focus on General Ledger (GL), Accounts Receivable (AR), and Accounts Payable 
(AP). 
The motivation for this study stems from the dominance of SAP R/3 in the 
international medium-to-large size organization market, the critical nature of 
separation of duties, and the lack of research into how to implement and assess this 
important internal control in R/3 environments. 
The next section describes the way in which user authorizations are administered in 
the R/3 system. 
1.5.1 Role-Based Access Control in R/3 
R/3 facilitates the implementation of role-based access control (RBAC). RBAC is a 
method of restricting users’ access to certain functions within the system. It is a 
‘logical access’ control. This means that the software itself restricts access, as 
compared with ‘physical access’ controls such as a lock on the computer room door. 
RBAC applies the ‘principle of least privilege’, which means that users have to be 
‘authorized’ to perform a certain action rather than ‘restricted’ from performing other 
actions [Pfleeger (1989: 246)]. Authorizations are associated with roles. Roles are 
assigned to users. These authorizations are necessary for users to be able to perform 
  Page 12 
their duties. If a user’s authorization profile contains no authorizations then that user 
cannot perform any action on the system. Users should have sufficient authorizations 
to be able to perform their duties and no more than that. Reviewing separation of 
duties in an R/3 system requires an understanding of several concepts namely 
authorization objects, authorizations, profiles, and transaction codes. 
Authorization objects are defined in the R/3 documentation [SAP AG (1997)]: 
Authorization objects allow you to define complex authorizations. An 
authorization object groups together up to 10 authorization fields in an 
AND relationship in order to check whether a user is allowed to perform 
a certain action. To pass an authorization test for an object, the user must 
satisfy the authorization check for each field in the object. 
 
Authorization objects are templates for authorizations. For example, one authorization 
object is ‘Accounting document: Authorization for Company Code’. This 
authorization object has two fields: 
• A list of the company codes where documents can be processed. 
• A list of the activities permitted for document processing in the abovementioned 
company codes. 
Authorizations are defined in the R/3 documentation as [SAP AG (1997)]: 
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Authority to perform a particular action in the R/3 System. Each 
authorization refers to one authorization object and defines one or more 
permissible values for each authorization field listed in the authorization 
object. Authorizations are combined in profiles which are entered in a 
user's master record. 
 
An authorization usually consists of two fields (but may have up to ten fields). The 
first field is usually the domain which could be one or more company codes for 
example. The second field is usually the activity permitted in the domain. This could 
be create, change, display, etc. Authorizations are based on authorization objects. 
Authorizations in R/3 are not assigned individually to users. Profiles, incorporating 
lists of authorizations, are created to represent user roles within the organization. 
These profiles are allocated to user master records and the users are then permitted to 
perform the functions authorized within that profile. Users may be allocated multiple 
profiles if appropriate and composite profiles which consist of two or more ‘simple 
profiles’. 
Each menu function in the R/3 system is assigned a transaction code. Transaction 
codes are linked to authorization objects. For a user to be authorized to perform a 
transaction code he/she must have authorizations in his/her profile(s) that are based on 
specific authorization objects. For example, to perform transaction code F-01 (posting 
document), users must have a valid authorization in their profile that is based on 
authorization object F_BKPF_BUK – Accounting Document: Authorization for 
company code. The authorization objects required for each transaction code are 
detailed in Table USOBT in SAP R/3. 
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1.6 Scope of this Research 
This project involves the development of a separation of duties framework for the FI 
module of SAP R/3.  
The framework consists of a set of organizational roles with allocated transaction 
codes and associated authorizations, developed from a set of separation of duties 
principles. Deviations from this framework by an organization may indicate a lack of 
proper separation of duties. A series of case studies are conducted to assess the 
appropriateness of this framework and to identify potential areas for refinement. 
2 FRAMEWORK DEVELOPMENT 
The primary objective of this framework is to propose a set of organizational roles for 
GL, AR, and AP based on the separation of duties principles outlined in section 1. 
Transaction codes and associated authorizations are allocated to these roles. This 
framework will assist auditors responsible for assessing separation of duties in an 
ERP environment. Deviations from this framework by an organization may indicate a 
lack of proper separation of duties. As described in section 1, a breakdown in 
separation of duties increases an organization’s exposure to employee fraud and error. 
These roles provide a reference point for the assessment of the separation of duties in 
an organization’s R/3 FI profiles. 
The following sections describe the design objectives of this framework in relation to 
General Ledger, Accounts Receivable and Accounts Payable. 
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2.1 General Ledger 
The specific objective within GL is to separate the entry and posting of GL 
transactions from the authorization to create, change and delete GL master records 
(principle G.1). In order to achieve this separation, two GL roles are proposed – GL 
Supervisor and GL Data Entry. Master record maintenance is deemed to be the more 
senior duty, and is allocated to the GL Supervisor. Transaction entry and posting are 
allocated to the GL Data Entry profile. The transaction codes associated with these 
two functions are illustrated by Table 2. 
Table 2 - GL Critical Transaction Codes 
A further profile is necessary to incorporate financial accounting transactions such as 
closing entries, accruals, tax returns, maintenance of bank master records, and 
archiving functions. This profile is titled “Accountant” and it is a senior profile which 
spans GL, AR and AP. 
2.2 Accounts Receivable 
The following separation of duties principles were used to develop the proposed 
framework in AR: 
G.1: Separation of master record maintenance from transaction entry. 
AR.1: Separation of credit management from master record maintenance. 
AR.2: Separation of dunning and credit management from invoice and receipt 
data entry. 
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AR.3: Separation of receipt data entry from invoice and credit memo data 
entry. 
AR.4: Separation of bad debts management from receipt data entry. 
 
 To achieve adequate separation of these duties, four AR profiles are proposed: AR 
Supervisor, AR Clerk (master record maintenance), AR Data Entry (Invoice), and AR 
Data Entry (Receipts). The Accountant profile was allocated financial accounting 
duties within AR. The transaction codes associated with these four roles are shown in 
Table 3. 
Table 3 – Critical AR Transaction Codes 
2.3 Accounts Payable 
The following two separation of duties principles were used to develop the proposed 
framework in AP: 
G.1: Separation of master record maintenance from transaction entry. 
AP.1: Separation of payments and cheque maintenance from invoice data 
entry. 
 
 To achieve adequate separation of these duties, three AP profiles are proposed: AP 
Supervisor, AP Clerk, and AP Data Entry. The transaction codes that are assigned to 
these roles are given in Table 4. 
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Table 4 - Critical AP Transaction Codes 
 
2.4 Allocating Authorization Objects & Field Values to Roles  
Having identified the minimum number of different roles required to achieve 
separation of duties, it is now necessary to allocate the remaining transaction codes to 
the roles created. For example, transaction code “FD03 – AR Master Record – 
Display” was given to all AR roles as well as the Accountant role. This was based on 
the assumption that merely viewing a master record was not a critical function and 
that for convenience it should be allocated to all AR roles. In contrast, transaction 
code “F.64 – Correspondence – Maintain” was allocated to AP Supervisor and not AP 
Data Entry even though it is not a critical function. This distinction was made on the 
assumption that maintaining correspondence was not something that would be 
performed by a data entry employee.  
To permit the assessment of authorizations given to the GL, AR and AP roles, the 
next stage in framework development was to identify the authorization objects and 
required field values for each transaction code in each role. This was achieved by 
analysis of the USOBT table which specifies the relationships between transaction 
codes and authorization objects. Using this table, a list of authorizations for each 
profile was generated. 
Once the list of authorizations was established for each profile, the next step was to 
examine whether the critical transaction codes were separated using these 
authorizations. A list of the critical transaction codes and their corresponding 
authorizations was reviewed for adequate separation of duties. Some problems were 
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found – particularly with posting. For example, many of these transactions had the 
same authorization object – F_BKPF_BUK with the activity field value ‘1’ (create). A 
profile that contained this authorization could perform any of the document posting 
transaction codes. A list of the critical transaction codes which only require this 
authorisation object and field value is given in Table 5. 
Table 5 - Transaction Codes Requiring Authorization Object F_BKPF_BUK 
It follows that further restriction is required to achieve satisfactory separation of 
duties. One method to improve restriction is the use of the authorization object 
S_TCODE – Authorization Check for Transaction Start. This authorization object 
enables an administrator to specify what transaction codes may be executed by a 
profile. Use of authorizations based on this object could eliminate the problems 
outlined previously.  
3 CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
This section describes the case studies that were performed in the course of this 
research. The objective of these case studies is to test the application of the theoretical 
framework and to further refine the framework. Three case studies were performed: 
1. This initial case study analysed SAP predefined profiles. The transaction codes for 
each profile in FI were available for analysis. 
2. This case study involved an analysis of the security model of an actual company 
(Company A). This security model provided details of organizational roles and 
authorizations for each profile. As such, the FI roles and profiles were analysed. 
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3. This case study analysed the security model of another actual company (Company 
B). This security model provided details of transaction codes not authorizations. 
As such, only the design not the implementation of the security model is analysed 
in this case study. 
In each case study the methodology applied was to review the separation of duties 
using the framework developed and then to classify differences as either anomalies 
(ie. problems with separation of duties in the case study) or as contributions to the 
framework. The sections following outline the findings for each of the case studies. 
3.1 Case Study 1 
Case study 1 examined the predefined profiles available from SAP that are relevant to 
GL, AR, and AP within the FI module. In this case study the authorizations were not 
available to be reviewed. Only the transaction codes were available. The roles 
available in GL, AR, and AP are displayed in Table 6.  
Table 6 - Case Study 1: Roles & Duties 
The duties assigned to the roles in Case Study 1 are quite broad. These profiles differ 
from the theoretical framework developed in this research in several fundamental 
aspects. The profiles do not include a GL Supervisor – these responsibilities are given 
to the Accounting Manager. The supervisor profiles inherited all of the duties of the 
clerk profiles. Finally, the Accounting Manager and Accounting Clerk profiles 
include duties from GL, AR, and AP. These combinations of duties include several 
assignments of incompatible duties to the same role.  
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The lack of roles that maintain master records presents a problem. This duty is 
consequently assigned to either the supervisor or the data entry (clerk in this case) 
profiles. The other main problem with these profiles is that the supervisor ‘inherits’ all 
of the duties of the lower profiles. For example, the AR Supervisor can perform all of 
the functions of the AR Clerk and the Accounting Manager can perform all of the 
duties of AR Supervisor, AP Supervisor, AR Clerk, AP Clerk, and GL Clerk. 
The lack of separation of duties in this case study can be demonstrated by a few 
examples: 
• AR and AP Clerks can maintain master records and post transactions. Therefore, 
an AP Clerk could change the payment details of an accounts payable to a bank 
account held by that employee and then post payments to that account payable to 
his or her own bank account. Alternatively, an AP Clerk could create a fake 
vendor master record and post fabricated invoices to that vendor and have the 
system pay his or her bank account. 
• The supervisor can maintain master records, post transactions, maintain credit (in 
AR), maintain cheques, and perform cheque reconciliations. There is no control 
over the activities of this user. He or she could defraud the organization in any of a 
number of ways. 
In summary, the profiles of case study 1 offer very limited separation of duties. This 
supports the statement by Haelst and Jansen (1997) that, “...usage of standard R/3 
authorizations and profiles is not recommended as these are defined too broadly”. 
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3.2 Case Study 2 
Case study 2 consisted of an analysis of Company A’s FI security model. This 
document contained details about the various organizational roles and the profiles that 
were created to fill those roles. The document gave details of the duties assigned to 
each role and the authorizations assigned to each profile.  
3.2.1 Design of Roles for Case Study 2 
The security model gives details of the duties to be authorized for each profile. The 
profiles or roles developed include GL Supervisor, GL Data Entry, AP Supervisor, AP 
Clerk, AP Data Entry, AR Supervisor, AR Clerk, AR Invoice Entry, and AR Receipt 
Entry. These profiles are summarised in Table 7. 
Table 7 - Case Study 2: Roles & Duties 
These roles differ minimally from the framework developed by this research in the 
duties to be authorized for each profile. 
The design of these roles incorporated satisfactory separation of duties. In addition to 
the critical separations of duties included in the framework, the security model of 
Company A included a separation of the entry and posting of AR and AP transactions. 
This is achieved through the use of the “park” and “post parked” transactions. In 
Company A’s security model the data entry profile can park transactions such as 
invoices and credit memos and the supervisor can post the parked transactions. This 
mechanism provides a separation of the entry from the authorization of transactions 
and may be included in the framework as an optional separation. If an organization 
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separated invoice and credit memo data entry from posting using this method, 
separation of invoice and credit memo data entry is unnecessary. 
The documentation provided by Company A for case study 2 includes both the design 
of the roles, and the authorizations that will be assigned to the profiles for these roles.  
3.2.2 Authorizations for Case Study 2 
This section analyses the authorizations assigned to each profile by Company A to 
assess the effectiveness of the implementation of the security model. 
Problems were apparent with the authorizations granted to the FI profiles for 
Company A. These problems include: no S_TCODE authorizations, use of ‘*’ in 
ACTVT (activity) fields, and the use of ‘*’ in KOART (account type) fields. 
Authorizations based on the S_TCODE Authorization Check for Transaction Start 
authorization object are necessary to achieve adequate separation of duties. The 
transaction codes executable by a profile should be specified using the S_TCODE 
authorization object as well as the authorization objects that are linked to the critical 
transaction codes through the USOBT table. The implication of Company A not using 
the S_TCODE authorization object is that there is no separation of duties between AR 
Invoice Entry and AR Receipt Entry. It appears that Company A has attempted to 
overcome this inadequacy by using the authorization object F_BKPF_BLA 
Accounting Document: Authorization for Document Types to specify different 
authorization groups for the data entry profiles. This is not an adequate solution 
however, as F_BKPF_BLA is not linked to any of the data entry transactions through 
the USOBT table. The result is that authorizations based on this authorization object 
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will not be checked for the critical data entry transactions (invoices, credit memos, 
receipts, etc.). 
Company A has used ‘*’ in its activity fields. In R/3 a ‘*’ is interpreted as being any 
value. Use of ‘*’ in authorizations could potentially grant more authorization to users 
than is intended. Company A has used ‘*’ in its account type fields as well as its 
activity fields. This reduces the separation of duties between GL, AR, and AP. The 
account type fields should contain a ‘k’ for accounts payable, an ‘s’ for general 
ledger, or a ‘d’ for accounts receivable. 
3.3 Case Study 3 
Case study 3 involved an analysis of Company B’s transaction codes that were 
assigned to the various organizational roles. The authorizations used to implement 
these profiles were not available for analysis. 
The roles that were deemed to be relevant to this research and the critical duties 
allowed for each are summarised within Table 8. 
Table 8 - Case Study 3: Roles & Duties 
The allocation of responsibilities in GL and AP in Company B corresponds with the 
proposed theoretical framework for separation of duties. The allocation of 
responsibilities in AR however, results in a breakdown of separation of duties in this 
area.  
Anomalies are apparent only in AR. One major cause of these anomalies is that there 
is not a specific role for customer master record maintenance as there is for vendor 
master record maintenance in AP. 
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The AR Clerk should not be permitted to maintain customer master records as well as 
posting invoices and credit memos. The ability to perform both of these functions 
increases the opportunities for an employee to defraud the organization. The AR Clerk 
would also not normally be permitted to maintain customer credit and post invoices. 
The ability to post invoices and maintain credit results in a loss of the independence of 
the ‘credit manager’. 
The AR Supervisor should not be permitted to post invoices and maintain credit for 
the same reason as for the AR Clerk. For the same reasons, the AR Supervisor should 
not be permitted to post invoices and maintain master records. 
Finally, the Cashier should not be permitted to post AR credit memos as well as 
record AR receipts. This is critical as a credit memo could be substituted for a receipt 
in order to cover a theft of cash. 
Although not specifically an anomaly, care should be taken with some of the 
transaction codes assigned in these roles. Transaction codes such as F.80 – Mass 
Reversal of Documents, FB01 – Post Document, FB02 – Change Document, and 
FB08 – Reverse Document are powerful transaction codes and care should be taken to 
ensure proper authorizations are in place to restrict the use of these transaction codes. 
4 CONCLUSION 
This paper has proposed a framework for the separation of duties within the GL, AR, 
and AP functions of the FI module of the SAP R/3 system. The development of this 
framework involved understanding the role of access controls, examining the SAP 
R/3 access control mechanism, developing principles for the separation of duties, and 
the development of a theoretical framework. 
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Analyses of three case studies provides support for the appropriateness of the 
framework. Both Company A and Company B had attempted to implement separation 
of duties using principles similar to those developed in this paper. The deficiencies in 
the SAP predefined profiles is well known and this was confirmed by the analysis in 
case study 1. Opportunities to refine the proposed framework were identified based on 
the results of case study 2. 
Two limitations of this research must be acknowledged. It is recognized that decisions 
about the internal controls to be implemented within an organization should be based 
on an appropriate risk analysis. Discussion of the relative costs of controls such as 
separation of duties was deemed to be beyond the scope of this study. Secondly, the 
framework developed was based on theory and refined using case studies. The 
limitation of case study research is that the results can provide support only for 
theoretical propositions and are not generalisable to populations (Yin 1989). Rigorous 
empirical testing has not been performed on this framework.  
This paper presents opportunities for several new avenues of research that would be 
beneficial. The theoretical framework could be extended to the other modules and the 
other functions within R/3. This would provide a complete picture of the duties and 
roles within R/3 as well as providing guidance for appropriate separation of duties 
within FI as a whole. A complete framework would be of great value for management 
and internal auditors, external auditors, and SAP implementation partners.  
A decision support application could be developed to automate the arduous task of 
checking the authorizations within profiles to assess adherence with the theoretical 
framework. This application could be designed using software such as Microsoft 
Access whereby the SAP tables could be downloaded and tested using a Visual Basic 
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application. Development of an application of this type would improve the analysis of 
an organization’s separation of duties by eliminating human error and improving 
efficiency. 
The case study research performed in the course of this research has identified 
problems with separation of duties in both of the organizations examined as well as 
identifying separation of duties problems in the SAP predefined roles. Although the 
empirical studies undertaken are not generalisable to the population, they do identify 
the need for further research on the adequacy of separation of duties in the population 
of organizations using SAP R/3 and the consequential implications. 
Finally, the theoretical framework could be assessed through a survey of experts (CIS 
auditors and SAP security administrators). Consensus on the adequacy of this 
framework could be assessed and useful feedback on cost-benefit issues could be 
gathered.  
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Tables 
Table 1 – Principles for the Separation of Duties  
Functional 
Area 
Separation 
All G.1: Separation of master record maintenance from transaction entry. 
G.2: Separation of entry of transactions from authorisation of 
transactions.1 
G.3: Separation between GL, AR, and AP functions. 
AR AR.1: Separation of credit management from master record 
maintenance. 
AR.2: Separation of dunning and credit management from invoice 
and receipt data entry. 
AR.3: Separation of receipt data entry from invoice and credit memo 
data entry. 
AR.4: Separation of bad debts management from receipt data entry. 
AP AP.1: Separation of payments and cheque maintenance from invoice 
data entry. 
 
Table 2 - GL Critical Transaction Codes 
Role Transaction Code 
GL Supervisor FS01: GL Master Records – create 
FS02: GL Master Records – change 
FS05: GL Master Records – block/unblock 
FS06: GL Master Records – mark for deletion 
FSP1: GL Master Records – chart of accounts – create 
FSP2: GL Master Records – chart of accounts – change 
FSP5: GL Master Records – chart of accounts – block/unblock 
FSP6: GL Master Records – chart of accounts – mark for 
deletion 
FSS1: GL Master Records – in company code – create 
FSS2: GL Master Records – in company code – change 
GL Data Entry F-02: GL Document Entry – GL account posting 
F-04: GL Document Entry – post with clearing 
F-06: GL Document Entry – incoming payment 
F-07: GL Document Entry – outgoing payment 
F-65: GL Document Entry – park document 
FB11: Post Held Document 
FBD2: Document – ref documents – recurring document – 
change 
                                                 
1 Optional separation of duties, this may not be feasible for some organizations. 
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FBV0: parked documents – post/delete 
FBV2: parked documents – change 
FBV6: parked documents – reject 
 
 
Table 3 – Critical AR Transaction Codes 
Role Transaction Code 
AR Supervisor F.28: AR Periodic Processing – credit management – reset 
credit limit 
F.29: AR Periodic Processing – info system – configure – 
create evaluations 
F.31: AR Environment – credit management – check – credit 
overview 
F.32: AR Environment – credit management – check – missing 
data 
F.34: AR,AP Periodic Processing – credit management – mass 
changes 
F.35: AR Environment – credit management – check – credit 
master sheet 
F110: AP,AR Periodic processing – payments 
FD32: AR Master Records – credit management – change 
F104: AR Periodic Processing – closing – valuate – reserve for 
bad debt 
F-27: AR Postings – credit memo 
F-67: AR Postings – park credit memo 
AR Clerk FD01: AR Master Records – create 
FD02: AR Master Records – change 
FD05: AR Master Records – block/unblock 
FD06: AR Master Records – mark for deletion 
AR Data Entry – 
Invoice 
F-22: AR Postings – invoice 
F-37: AR Postings – down payment – request 
F-59: AP,AR Postings – payment request 
F-64: AR Postings – park invoice 
FB11: Post Held Document 
AR Data Entry – 
Receipt 
F-26: AR Postings – payment fast entry 
F-28: AR Postings – incoming payment 
F-34: AR Postings – bill of exchange – collection 
F-36: AR Postings – bill of exchange – payment 
F-39: AR Postings – down payment – clearing 
FB11: Post Held Document 
FBE1: AR Postings – payment advice – create 
FBE2: AR Postings – payment advice – change 
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Table 4 - Critical AP Transaction Codes 
Role Transaction Code 
AP Supervisor F110: AP,AR Periodic processing – payments 
F-40: AP Postings – Bill of exchange – payment 
F-41: AP Postings – credit memo 
F-48: AP Postings – down payment – down payment 
F-53: AP Postings – outgoing payment – post 
F-58: AP Postings – outgoing payment – post + print forms 
F-66: AP Postings – park credit memo 
FCH3: AP,AR Environment – check info – void – unused 
checks 
FCH4: AP,AR Environment – check info – change – renumber 
FCH5: AP,AR Environment – check info – create – manual 
checks 
FCH6: AP,AR Environment – check info – change – 
additional info/cash 
FCH7: AP,AR Environment – check info – change – reprint 
check 
FCH8: AP,AR Environment – check info – void – cancel 
payment 
FCH9: AP,AR Environment – check info – void – issued 
checks 
FCHD: AP,AR Environment – check info – delete – for 
payment run 
FCHE: AP,AR Environment – check info – delete – voided 
checks 
FCHF: AP,AR Environment – check info – delete – manual 
checks 
FCHG: AP,AR Environment – check info – delete – reset data 
FCHR: AP,AR Environment – check info – change – online 
cashed checks 
FCHT: AP,AR Environment – check info – change – 
assignment to payment 
FCHX: AP,AR Environment – check info – external data 
transfer 
AP Clerk FK01: AP Master records – create 
FK02: AP Master records – change 
FK05: AP Master records – block/unblock 
FK06: AP Master records – mark for deletion 
AP Data Entry F-43: AP Postings – invoice 
F-47: AP Postings – down payment – request 
F-57: AP Postings – other – noted item 
F-63: AP Postings – park invoice 
FB10: AP Postings – invoice/credit memo fast entry 
FB11: Post Held Document 
FBV0: parked documents – post/delete 
FBV2: parked documents – change 
FBV4: parked documents – change header 
FBV6: parked documents – reject 
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Table 5 - Transaction Codes Requiring Authorization Object F_BKPF_BUK 
Transaction 
Code 
Description 
F-02 GL Document Entry – GL account posting 
F-06 GL Document Entry – incoming payment 
F-07 GL Document Entry – outgoing payment 
F-22 AR Postings – invoice 
F-26 AR Postings – payment fast entry 
F-27 AR Postings – credit memo 
F-28 AR Postings – incoming payment 
F-34 AR Postings – bill of exchange – collection 
F-36 AR Postings – bill of exchange – payment 
F-40 AP Postings – Bill of exchange – payment 
F-41 AP Postings – credit memo 
F-43 AP Postings – invoice 
F-53 AP Postings – outgoing payment – post 
F-57 AP Postings – other – noted item 
F-59 AP,AR Postings – payment request 
 
 
Table 6 - Case Study 1: Roles & Duties 
Role Duties 
AP Clerk • Data entry and posting for credit memo, invoice, 
outgoing payment.  
• Create manual cheques. 
• Master record maintenance. 
AP Supervisor • Data entry and posting for credit memo, invoice, 
outgoing payment. 
• Archiving of transactions. 
• Cheque maintenance. 
• Master record maintenance. 
AR Clerk • Data entry and posting for AR transactions. 
• Create manual cheques. 
• Master record maintenance. 
AR Supervisor • Credit management. 
• Bad debts. 
• Data entry and posting for AR transactions. 
• Archiving of transactions. 
• Cheque management. 
• Master record maintenance. 
Accounting Clerk • GL, AR, AP transactions (invoices etc). 
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• Create manual cheques. 
• GL, AR, AP master record maintenance. 
Accounting Manager • GL, AR, AP transactions (invoices etc). 
• Create manual cheques. 
• GL, AR, AP master record maintenance. 
• Credit management. 
• GL closing entries. 
• Transaction archiving. 
• Cheque management. 
GL Accountant • GL closing entries. 
• GL transaction data entry and posting. 
• Master record maintenance. 
 
 
Table 7 - Case Study 2: Roles & Duties 
Role Duties 
GL Supervisor • GL Account Maintenance 
GL Data Entry • GL Journal Data Entry 
AP Supervisor • Payment runs 
• Manual Cheques 
• Cheque Management 
• Post Parked Invoices/Credit Memos 
AP Clerk • Vendor Maintenance 
AP Data Entry • Park Invoice/Credit Memos 
AR Supervisor • Dunning Runs 
• Customer Analysis 
• Credit Management 
• Post Parked Invoices/Credit Memos 
AR Clerk • Customer Maintenance 
AR Invoice Entry • Park Invoices/Credit Memos 
AR Receipt Entry • Post Receipts 
 
 
Table 8 - Case Study 3: Roles & Duties 
Role Duties 
AP Officer • Invoices and Credit Memos 
• Change, Reverse Documents 
AP Supervisor • Mass Reversal of Documents 
• Cheque Maintenance 
• Payments 
Vendor Maintainer • Vendor Maintenance 
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AR Clerk • Invoices and Credit Memos 
• Post, Change, Reverse Documents 
• Customer Maintenance 
• Credit Maintenance 
AR Supervisor • Mass Reversal of Documents 
• Invoices and Credit Memos 
• Customer Maintenance 
• Credit Maintenance 
Cashier • Post GL Transactions 
• AR Receipts and Credit Memos 
Chart of Accounts Maintainer • GL Master Records Maintenance 
• Chart of Accounts Master Records Maintenance 
Journal Processor • Post GL Document 
 
